The economics of international migration: A short history of the debate by Hatton, Timothy J
1 
 
The Economics of International Migration: A Short History of the Debate 
Timothy J. Hatton 
(University of Essex and Australian National University) 
April 2014 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a view of progress over the last quarter century in the economics of 
international migration. I focus on two long established topics and two that have surged in 
the last decade. Interest in immigrant and assimilation and in the labour market effects of 
immigration has been kept going by methodological debates and by the diffusion of 
empirical work from the United States to the wider world. More recently, the difficult 
politics of immigration policy has fuelled the research agenda and has given rise to a new 
literature on the forces that drive immigration policy and on the assessment of its effects. 
Important also is the growth of interest in the causes and consequences of emigration from 
developing countries. Most notable has been the revival of interest in the brain drain and 
the wider consequences of the expanding emigrant diaspora.  
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Introduction 
The last quarter of a century has seen a flowering of research on migration and immigration.  
A large empirical edifice has been constructed on a relatively slender theoretical base.  And 
while some topics have faded in importance, others have more than made up for it. The 
original topics include immigrant assimilation and the impact of immigration on the earnings 
of non-immigrant workers. The debate on these topics has been kept alive by three things. 
First, although we have learned a lot, some of the key empirical issues are still unresolved 
and this had led to ongoing refinement of models, methods and data. Second, studies for 
the United States (and other settler countries) have been transposed to a widening range of 
other countries and settings. In Europe this has been fostered by the rapid growth of 
immigration itself. Third, immigration has been, and still is, a hot political topic. In some 
cases it has led to a polarization of academics into pro- and anti-immigration camps, and 
this has added heat, and occasionally light, to the academic debate. 
From the late 1990s, it is possible to discern several new waves in the focus and direction of 
research. Economists have explored dimensions of migration that were previously neglected 
or that were the domain of other social sciences. Here I focus on two clusters of activity. The 
first is immigration policy, which includes the analysis of public opinion and the link with 
policy formation. It also includes the analysis of the effects of policy on the volume and 
direction of migration and the characteristics of migrants. A second trend is the growing 
focus on emigration rather than immigration and on source countries rather than on the 
destination. This has seen a proliferation of studies on topics as diverse as remittances and 
refugee movements.  But perhaps most prominent is the renewed focus on the brain drain 
and more generally the consequences of emigration for poor source countries. In choosing 
to focus on these areas I omit much of the ever widening scope of migration analysis and I 
make no attempt to be comprehensive.  
The Traditional Issues: Assimilation and Impact 
The economic assimilation of immigrants 
The first issue is immigrant assimilation—the speed and degree to which immigrants catch 
up with the native born in earnings employment and in other dimensions. The modern 
literature started with the seminal paper by Barry Chiswick (1978) showing strong wage 
assimilation for immigrants in the United States. Borjas (1985, 1995) pointed out that if 
successive cohorts differ in their labour market “quality” then a cross-sectional estimate 
would be misleading guide to the experience of any given cohort. The specific focus was the 
apparent downward shift in the earnings functions of immigrants relative to natives in the 
United States from around 1970 until the 1990s. Its proximate cause was the shift in the 
sources of US immigration away from Western Europe and towards poorer countries in 
Latin America and Asia. Two key findings emerged from this debate. The first is that 
3 
 
immigrants do assimilate even if they don’t catch up with natives in a single generation. 
Studies of immigrants in a range of countries support this view, with one important caveat. 
For most destination countries immigrant assimilation is stronger in employment rates and 
weaker in wage rates than for the United States. Second, there are large differences in the 
labour market performance of immigrants by source country, even controlling for 
observables such as education; in general, the poorer the source country the poorer the 
performance.  
The literature on assimilation has spawned two important strands. The first is to discover 
what initial disadvantages immigrants suffer and how these obstacles are overcome. The 
most important feature to emerge is proficiency in the host country language. Language 
proficiency has a sizeable effect on earnings (up to 40 percent), especially when account is 
taken of endogeneity and measurement error (Chiswick and Miller, 1995; Dustmann and 
van Soest, 2001). The acquisition of host country skills and education is highly contingent on 
language proficiency. Also important is access to immigrant networks (Munshi, 2003). A 
striking feature of the assimilation literature is that it gets away from an older tradition that 
consigned all unmeasured differences in immigrant and native earnings to ‘discrimination’—
a concept that Oaxaca decompositions cannot illuminate. But the cost is a lack of social 
context: immigrants are seen as assimilating as atomistic individuals in an anonymous soup 
called the host country labour market. While sociologists have embraced the idea that 
outcomes for immigrants depend in large part on the ‘context of reception’ in the host 
society, economists are yet to take this very seriously.  
One thread of the literature that goes part of the way delves into the effects of ethnic 
concentration (or ghettos) on the assimilation process. If there is discrimination against 
immigrants in the wider community then individuals may gain by remaining within the ethic 
community, something that may be enhanced by specialisation in ethnic goods. On the 
other hand ethnic communities may involve crowding externalities, negative peer group 
effects and reduced opportunities for profitable trade. Hence the effects of ethnic 
concentrations on immigrant outcomes could go either way and the results may differ 
across ethnic groups and with the characteristics of the individual immigrant.1 Borjas (1992) 
finds that the income, education and occupational prestige of second-generation 
immigrants are inherited partly from their parents and partly, as an ethnic capital 
externality, from the ethnic group as a whole. The results suggest that there is considerable 
persistence in performance from one generation to the next, much of it arising from the 
transmission of ethnic capital (see also Card, 2005).  
                                                             
1 A number of studies have addressed the endogeneity issue that arises from migration across localities. Those 
that choose to migrate away from the ghetto may have superior characteristics and hence the measured effect 
of ethnic concentration may be partly due to self-selection.  
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This strand of assimilation literature has increasingly moved into the territory long occupied 
by sociologists (see Alba and Nee 1997). For example, one line of enquiry looks at ethnic 
identity and the degree to which ethnic minority immigrants choose to define themselves 
outside (or even in opposition to) the mainstream culture. Overall the evidence suggests 
that maintaining a distinct ethnic identity is not an impediment for education and 
employment among those who also embrace the mainstream culture (Zimmermann et al. 
2007; Casey and Dustmann 2010). The literature also extends to issues such as civic and 
political participation, intermarriage and fertility behavior, health and life satisfaction.  And 
it increasingly treats such variables as outcomes of interest in their own right, rather than as 
intermediate variables to explain wages or employment. Thus what was becoming a 
somewhat stale literature has been reinvigorated and broadened by shifting the focus into 
other disciplinary domains.  
The second development stemming from the literature on assimilation is self-selection. 
Borjas (1987) developed a version of the Roy model to show that immigrants could be 
positively or negatively selected from the source country population depending on the 
conditions they face. If the return to skill is higher at home than at the destination, then 
immigrants will tend to be negatively self-selected on the skills that are rewarded by the 
labour market.  Thus immigrants do not have to be positively selected as is (or was) 
routinely assumed. The implication is that migrants from countries that are poor and 
unequal relative to the destination are more likely to be negatively selected. However this 
neglects the costs of immigration. If the costs vary less than in proportion to earnings then 
this will offset negative selection by making migration less attractive to the low skilled.  
The Roy model has been at the heart of a large number of empirical studies. While it was 
originally invoked to explain the performance of immigrants in the host labour market, 
attention subsequently turned towards more direct assessments of self-selection into 
emigration from the origin country. Again the initial focus has been on immigration to the 
United States, especially from Mexico. Following Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) a number of 
studies have compared the characteristics of immigrants with non-immigrants in the source 
country.  Broadly speaking the results suggest that immigrants are drawn disproportionately 
from the middle of the distribution of education and wages. That would be consistent with 
higher returns to education attenuating migration from the top of the distribution while 
higher fixed costs attenuate migration from the bottom. But this leaves aside many other 
influences on migrant selection, such as pre-existing migrant networks and differences in 
the incentive to emigrate from rural and urban areas. One of the most important costs is 
that imposed by immigration policy. Although illegal migration from Mexico to the US is 
feasible, it is still costly. In the case of Puerto Rico (which is poor and unequal) there are no 
such barriers and the evidence suggests that migrants to the US are negatively selected 
while return migrants are positively selected (Borjas, 2008). 
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Migrants from Mexico and Puerto Rico to the United States are unlikely to be typical; most 
international migrants face higher policy hurdles and greater costs of migration. Data on the 
migrant stock in OECD countries from a range of developing countries indicates that those 
migrants have much higher average levels of education than the source country populations 
from which they were drawn. Some of this reflects education acquired post-migration but 
the evidence from surveys of migrant intentions indicates that those with more education 
are more likely to plan to emigrate. Yet as most of the source counties are poor and unequal 
relative to the potential destinations that should mean strongly negative selection. One 
explanation is that potential migrants respond to absolute income gaps, which are larger for 
the more skilled, rather than relative gaps, which are larger for the unskilled (Grogger and 
Hanson, 2012). This can explain both the selection from a given source country and the 
sorting across destinations but it is inconsistent with concave utility. Alternatively positive 
selection from poor countries may reflect severe poverty constraints (Belot and Hatton 
2012), although their precise nature is hard to identify.2 As noted further below, those 
constraints might be made tighter by skill selective policies, but looser by family 
reunification policies (for those fortunate enough to have relatives at the destination).  
The literature on immigrant assimilation has endured by becoming broader and deeper. It 
has broadened as researchers have applied the methods developed in the United States to a 
wider array of countries and settings, and as the concept of what we mean by assimilation 
has expanded into the social sphere. Richer datasets have helped make this possible and 
allowed the assessments to include return and circular migration. At the same time the 
slender theoretical foundation upon which the original assimilation models were built has 
been elaborated and increasingly refocused on the migration decision and on conditions in 
countries of origin. These shifts in the research agenda have kept alive a literature that 
might otherwise have gone into decline.        
The labour market impact of Immigration. 
In the standard partial equilibrium labour market model, with a downward sloping labour 
demand curve, an immigration-induced increase in labour supply should reduce the average 
wage and shift the income distribution in favour of profits. Alternatively, if wages are sticky 
then, to the extent that immigrants find jobs, they reduce native-born employment. With 
few exceptions the first round of studies suggested that the wage or employment effects of 
immigration are close to zero. An analysis of 18 studies found that the average effect on 
natives of a one per cent increase in the migrant share of the labour force was to depress 
the native wage by just 0.11 percent (Longhi et al, 2005). Such results seem inconsistent 
with the usual elasticities of labour demand of around -0.3 to -0.5 and they cast doubt on 
the standard framework that underpins much of the political economy of immigration. But 
most of these studies sought to isolate the effects of immigration by correlating wage or 
                                                             
2 One reason for thinking that capital market failure is important is the difficulty of providing collateral for a 
loan, the purpose of which is to leave the country.  
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employment rate changes with immigrant inflows across localities within the receiving 
country. If the effects of immigration to a locality are somehow diffused across the wider 
economy then the so-called spatial correlations approach will underestimate the true 
national effects.  
Much of the debate has focused on accounting for, and overcoming, the potential biases in 
the spatial correlations approach. One concern is that immigrants locate in booming 
regions, and a variety of methods have been used to account for this endogeneity. More 
important is the possibility that immigration to a locality displaces the some of the native-
born and previous immigrants to other localities.  The debate was initially stimulated by the 
apparent absence of any native employment or wage effects following the Mariel boatlift 
that brought 125,000 Cubans to Miami in 1980, adding about 7 percent to its labour force 
(Card, 1990).  In order to test whether such results are generalizable subsequent studies 
modelled the mobility of the native-born in response to a local immigration shock. The 
results were mixed but displacement effects were often found to be small and sometimes 
even perverse. To give one example, Card (2001) found no effect of immigration on a cross 
section of changes in the labour force across US cities in 1985-90. Further studies using 
different variable definitions and employing differences-in-differences methodology came 
to largely the same conclusion. One particular issue is that, for most local labour markets, 
the contribution of immigration is small as compared with other influences and so inference 
is difficult. Yet, taken at face value, these results simply deepen the puzzle: if the wage 
effects of immigration are modest then displacement effects should be large, but they are 
not. 
Another possibility is that the local demand for labour is indeed highly elastic as a result of 
inter-regional trade (Rybczynski effects) and/or capital flows. But at the national level labour 
demand would likely be less elastic and the wage effect of immigration accordingly greater. 
Some evidence on the national effects of immigration comes from immigration shocks. One 
is the repatriation of the Algerian pieds noirs to France in 1962 (Hunt, 1992); another is the 
retornados from Angola and Mozambique to Portugal in 1994-6 (Carrington and di Lima, 
1996). These immigration shocks seem to have substantially reduced average wages despite 
being interpreted to the contrary, and they deserve further scrutiny. Another ‘natural 
experiment’ is provided by the influx of Russian Jews to Israel when the Soviet Union lifted 
its restrictions on emigration late in 1989. Again, the wage effects seem to have been more 
negative than some would suggest (Hatton and Williamson, 2005, pp. 299-302).  
In his landmark study Borjas (2003) sought to sidestep the puzzles raised by spatial 
correlations by analysing the impact of immigration by 32 education/experience groups at 
the national level in the US for the census years 1970 to 2000. The idea is that there is less 
scope for mobility across education and experience groups than there is between cities or 
regions. He concluded that the labour demand curve is indeed downward sloping with an 
elasticity of about -0.3 to -0.4. Allowing some substitutability between age/experience 
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groups, the effect of immigration over the 1980s and 1990s was to reduce native wage by 
8.9 percent for high school dropouts and by 3.2 percent overall (Borjas, 2003, p. 1369). 
Applying the same methodology at the state level suggested much smaller wage effects, 
implying larger displacement effects than the previous literature suggested (Borjas 2003, 
2006).  
The specification that delivered these results has been challenged on several grounds. The 
most important is that within each education/experience group immigrants and natives may 
be imperfect substitutes.3 Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find that even with relatively high 
within-group substitutability the effects of immigration on native wages are attenuated and 
the effect on the wage of previous immigrant cohorts is magnified (see also Manacorda, 
Manning and Wadsworth, 2012). Perhaps the latter is not surprising as immigrants are a 
relatively small share of the labour market. But it does raise the question of why immigrants 
and natives with similar observable characteristics are less than perfect substitutes. One 
possible answer to this is that immigrants’ task-specific skill sets differ from those of natives 
(Peri and Sparber, 2009). Another is that those from countries with weak education systems 
have fewer skills than their qualifications would suggest (Mattoo et al, 2008; Coulombe and 
Tremblay, 2009) and so the relevant competitor group is not natives with the same 
observable skills. Even with the same skill levels, differences could arise because immigrants 
at early stages in the process of assimilation are placed lower in the wage distribution than 
their true skills warrant (Dustmann et al., 2012). Interestingly, it is only recently that 
researchers have drawn what now seem obvious links between the labour market effects of 
immigration and the assimilation literature.  
These links are a little stronger in another branch of the recent literature: the fiscal impacts 
of immigration. Do immigrants pay more in taxes than they take out in benefits and public 
services? This is an important issue that shapes perceptions and policies towards 
immigrants. The net fiscal contribution of immigrants depends on whether it is calculated at 
a point in time or over the lifecycle, and on which taxes and benefits are included. But 
outcomes are chiefly driven by two interacting factors. One is that those with more than 
high school education generally make a net contribution while those with lower skills 
impose a net cost (Smith and Edmondson, 1997; Storsletten 2000). The other is that the 
more generous is the welfare state and the less flexible is the labour market the greater is 
the net fiscal burden imposed by low-skilled immigrants (Storsletten, 2003; Boeri, 2010). 
Thus the fiscal costs are a particular concern for some European countries where, over the 
last 30 years, the welfare state has expanded and the labour market performance of 
immigrants has deteriorated.  
There are, of course, many other effects of immigration. At the macro level these have been 
widely analysed in general equilibrium models with neoclassical trade-theoretic 
                                                             
3 Another critique is that the estimating equations incorporate a negative bias (Peri and Sparber, 2011) 
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foundations. These models have become increasingly sophisticated (useful surveys are 
Treffler 1998; Drinkwater et al, 2003), but three points are worth making. First, until 
recently, the calibrations used in such models have largely ignored the empirical findings of 
immigration economists. Second the wider effects operating through trade, capital flows 
and the public sector can easily swamp the partial equilibrium labour market effects. And 
third, the general equilibrium setting focuses attention not only on the distributional effects 
but also on the overall immigration surplus. Ironically, the labour market literature, which is 
generally pro-immigration, has focused largely on the absence of losses for the potential 
losers rather than stressing the scale of benefits for the gainers.  
By contrast with the assimilation literature, assessments of the impact of immigration have 
remained firmly in the economic sphere. The debate initially expanded to a wider range of 
countries but methodological issues have played an increasing role. This is because first 
generation studies produced results that seem incompatible with standard economic 
analysis. Fuelled by the ongoing policy debate, attention has increasingly shifted towards 
the fiscal effects of immigration, where methodological issues are yet to become a central 
focus.   This combination of policy relevance and lack of academic consensus will continue to 
stimulate the quest for a more comprehensive and internally consistent account of 
migration’s economic impact.  
Immigration Policy: Causes and Effects 
Explaining immigration policies 
Policy formation is central to the immigration debate, yet until recently, it has been largely 
the domain of political science rather that economics. The standard partial equilibrium 
model tells us why we might expect immigration policy to be restrictive. If workers 
outnumber the owners of capital at the ballot box then the median voter will oppose 
immigration.4 Thus the puzzle is not why immigration policy in developed countries is so 
restrictive, but rather, why it is not even more restrictive. Benhabib (1996) showed that if 
workers bring some capital or human capital with them then the constituency that opposes 
immigration depends on whether immigration increases or reduces the capital-labour ratio. 
If immigration is unskilled then a coalition of capitalists and skilled workers could form a 
majority in favour of immigration.  
An obvious place to start is with public opinion. It has long been known that the majority of 
voters in most countries oppose immigration. The question is why. A number of studies 
have set out to test what we might call the factor-proportions version of public opinion. The 
universal finding from the many datasets that are now available is that the less educated the 
individual the more anti-immigration he or she is likely to be. This was originally interpreted 
                                                             
4  Even though the total gain to capitalists exceeds the total loss to workers (there is a net immigration 
surplus). 
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as reflecting the individual’s labour market position: if immigrants are unskilled then the 
skilled have less to fear (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; O’Rourke and Sinnott). Studies of 
immigration opinion have also found that concerns about the fiscal costs weigh heavily with 
some citizens (Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Boeri, 2010). One piece of evidence is that while 
pro-immigration attitudes are positively related to education, reflecting labour market 
competition, conditional on this, they are negatively related to income, reflecting concerns 
about the tax implications of immigrant welfare dependency. This helps to explain why 
attitudes are sometimes negative even among those higher up the scale of class, education 
and income. 
Political scientists, for whom the study of attitudes has a longer history, take a rather 
different view. For example Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 2010) argue that if labour market 
competition is the issue then individuals should be more negative towards immigrants with 
their own skill level. But they are not; both the highly educated and the less educated are 
more favourable to high-skilled immigration. Rather, they find that the more educated have 
greater tolerance towards minorities and are more positive about ethnic and cultural 
diversity, and this explains two thirds of the gradient between attitudes and education. 
Other evidence suggests that attitudes are typically more negative towards ethnic and 
religious minorities (Dustmann and Preston 2007). A large literature also finds that anti-
immigrant attitudes are associated with racism, nationalism and ethnocentrism, although 
regressing one attitude on another leaves the causal mechanisms rather unclear (but see 
Card et al., 2012). Such attitudes are also associated with self-assignment on the right of the 
political spectrum and with membership of far right political parties (Kessler and Freeman, 
2005). 
One rather neglected issue is the effect of migration itself on attitudes. Survey evidence 
indicates that individuals have very little idea of the true scale of immigration. Yet there is 
some broad correspondence across countries between immigration and negative attitudes 
(Lahav 2004). But the cross-country evidence is rather ambiguous and there is an obvious 
issue of reverse causation (negative attitudes lead to restrictive policies which lower 
immigration).  There is, however, a tradition of research on whether the individual’s contact 
with immigrants, and especially neighbourhood ethnic minority concentrations, leads to 
more positive or more negative attitudes. Taking account of self-selection across locations 
(sometimes called white-flight) indicates that this effect is negative, at least for Britain 
(Dustmann and Preston, 2001). That raises a much wider question about the design of 
public policies that influence ethnic minority concentrations.  
The analysis of public opinion has been illuminating but there remains a vast chasm 
between people’s attitudes and the immigration policies pursued by their elected 
representatives. So, why are immigration policies less restrictive than people actually want? 
One view is that immigration politics in liberal democracies is characterised by an 
‘expansionary bias’ (Freeman, 1995). The main reason for this is that anti-immigration 
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sentiment is diffuse while pro-immigration sentiment is concentrated. In Freeman’s terms 
immigration is dominated by clientilist politics; in simple terms capitalists are well organised 
and they have economic and political clout.  In an important paper, Facchini et al. (2011) 
show that business groups in the United States have invested substantial resources in 
lobbying for sector-specific visa allocations in temporary worker programmes. The evidence 
suggests that this activity is successful although it is often opposed by organised labour. The 
strength of industry lobbies and the weakness of unions could explain why immigration 
policies have remained more open in the United States than in other countries and why this 
gap has narrowed in recent decades. Such hypotheses are yet to be fully tested.  
A different perspective is to compare immigration policy with policy on international trade. 
While opinion favouring restricting imports is somewhat weaker than that on restricting 
immigration, trade has been liberalised by orders of magnitude more than migration. One 
argument is that, unlike international trade, immigration has a social dimension, which 
makes it much more politically contested territory (Greenaway and Nelson, 2006). Here the 
pro-immigration pressure groups range from ethnic minority interests to those concerned 
with civil rights and humanitarian issues; these are counterbalanced by nativist and 
nationalist lobbies as well as by the economic concerns previously mentioned. This perhaps 
explains why in OECD countries as a whole the main modes of admission are family 
reunification and refugees, with less than a quarter entering through the employment 
channel. In addition, unlike international trade, immigration inflows to developed countries 
are not broadly balanced by outflows. Thus, there is no powerful economic interest group 
(analogous to exporters in international trade) that is vigorously lobbying governments to 
strike deals for access to foreign labour markets in exchange for lower barriers to 
immigration. This is an important reason why we see multilateral agreements, based on 
reciprocity, for international trade but not for international migration (Hatton 2007).  
As noted earlier, economists are latecomers to the analysis of immigration attitudes and 
policy and they have come to grips only partially with the longer standing debates in 
political science. While some progress has been made there are two key lacunae. One is that 
the cross sectional analysis of attitudes tells us how composition affects attitudes, not how 
attitudes are formed and changed over time. The other is the vexed issue of how attitudes 
and other variables drive shifts in policy. It seems that there is more to be learned from 
political science.   
Immigration flows and immigration policy  
Immigration policy is a system of rationing; it differs from trade policy where tariffs raise the 
price of entry and are therefore more easily incorporated into economic models. If the 
quantity constraint is binding then the scale and composition of immigration should depend 
only on the structure of immigration policies. Yet recent studies have shown that source-
country economic and demographic forces still matter. Some studies have examined the 
patterns of immigration from a range of source countries to a single destination. One study 
11 
 
for immigration to the United States finds that income gaps, inequality, source country 
demographics all influenced the flow of immigrants from different source countries (Clark et 
al., 2007). Several studies have modelled the immigration flows by source country to a set of 
OECD destinations, stressing the importance of host country variables such as GDP per 
capita and measures of welfare state generosity. But the most important finding is that the 
volume of migration to a destination from a particular source country is conditioned by 
proximity, by cultural and language affinities and above all by past migration as reflected in 
the stock of previous immigrants (for a recent example, see Adsera and Pytlikova, 2012) 
Why do economic forces matter so much? One reason is that immigration policy is not the 
strict rationing system that is sometimes envisaged. Most countries set multiple criteria for 
entry, which may be adjusted according to domestic economic conditions, rather than fixing 
an overall quota. This is especially so for family reunification and refugee streams, which 
represent the bulk of all immigration. Another reason is that some economic and 
demographic variables that appear in the regressions represent a mix of incentive and 
policy. One example is the often powerful effect of migrant stock in the destination country. 
This captures the effect of networks on the incentive to migrate from a given source country 
but it also reflects the degree to which family reunification policy permits it. Nevertheless, 
policy shifts should matter, and several studies find discernible, if modest, effects for 
dummy variables representing identifiable policy changes.  
One of the biggest challenges has been to somehow characterise subtle and complex 
immigration policies in the form of index numbers, something that recent studies have 
attempted to do (Mayda 2010; Ortega and Peri, 2012). For rich destination countries the 
average tightening of entry laws reduced immigration by about six percent (Ortega and Peri, 
2012). But different branches of policy will have different effects, partly because there is no 
common metric. One important distinction is between policies that determine entry and 
those that determine the ability to stay.  Another dimension is characterising policy relating 
to different immigrant streams.  For example policy towards asylum seekers is very different 
from that of other branches of immigration policy, because of differences in underlying 
motivations and in the legal framework. One attempt to assess the effects of policy on 
asylum applications to a set of OECD countries finds that tougher refugee status 
determination procedures and tighter border controls reduce asylum applications while the 
living conditions that asylum seekers face after arrival have very little effect (Hatton, 2009).  
As most countries apparently want to raise the proportion of their immigrants that is highly 
skilled, not least because of concerns about the fiscal costs, it would be useful to know more 
about the effects of skill-selective policies. Here the data constraints are even more severe 
and much of the focus has been on immigrant stocks (or changes in stocks) rather than on 
flows. Several studies have examined the effects of skill selection, often as dummies for 
countries that have points systems. While such measures could be (and are being) 
improved, it is doubtful that tweaking the skill requirements in what are already selective 
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employment streams will have more than marginal effects. More important would be 
altering the composition of immigration streams. In 2010 employment stream immigrants 
accounted for just 21 percent of permanent immigrants to the OECD, as compared with 20 
percent admitted through free movement and 36 percent though family reunification 
(OECD, 2012, Table I.4). Despite the dominance of family reunification, migration is still 
typically modelled as if it were exclusively a labour market decision.  Studies that 
disaggregate immigration streams or that focus more directly on family reunification are still 
remarkably rare.  
The debate on the impact of immigration policy is an area that has been stimulated by 
controversies over policy. One example is the construction of forecasts about the effects of 
policy change. But progress has been limited and has been severely constrained by lack of 
appropriate data. That constraint is being eased as more refined measures of policy become 
available. But there is also a need to better understand the source country constraints, how 
migration streams start and persist, and above all to bring the analysis of family 
reunification and humanitarian migration to centre stage. It seems likely that this will 
provide a rich ongoing research agenda.  
Emigration and the Source Country 
Brain drain or brain gain? 
One of the most important themes in recent research is the likely effects of South-North 
migration on conditions in the source countries. Pre-eminent among these is the revival of 
interest in the brain drain, a topic that went into quiescence after a flurry of activity in the 
1960s and 1970s. This renewed activity has been driven by two factors. The first is the 
development of models which suggest that the selective emigration of the high-skilled and 
high-educated could stimulate the acquisition of education in poor source countries, 
creating a brain gain that could counterbalance the original brain drain (e.g. Mountford, 
1997; Stark et al., 1997). The other cathartic influence is the development of far richer and 
more comprehensive datasets than were previously available. Particularly important is the 
database produced by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and its subsequent refinements, which 
has formed the basis for most of the recent studies. These data are census-based estimates 
for the stock of adult immigrants in each OECD country by source country, by education and 
by gender. 
So how big is the brain drain? For most of the world’s poorer countries the brain drain is not 
particularly large. For the world as a whole the emigration rate for the college educated is 
only slightly higher than the rate for those with less than college education. It is most severe 
for those countries in the low and middle income group, that are relatively small 
(populations of less than 10 million) and are situated close to rich potential destinations.  As 
of 2001 more than four fifths of those with tertiary education born in Guyana, Jamaica and 
Haiti had emigrated, and the rates also exceed 50 percent for a number of countries in sub-
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Saharan Africa. Perhaps even more important are the high rates of emigration in key 
professions such as doctors and nurses from Africa and engineers and IT specialists from 
India (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012, p. 688). But contrary to popular opinion the brain drain 
is not getting worse. Except in sub-Saharan Africa and Central America, source country 
education has largely kept pace with high skilled emigration (Docquer and Rapoport, 2012, 
p. 689).  
How has the brain drain affected the stock of skills in source countries? In the absence of a 
positive educational response to emigration the outcome would be negative, as the older 
literature assumed. By increasing the scarcity and hence the return on skills at home 
emigration could induce a compensating response but replacement would only be partial. 
However, the mechanism invoked by the more recent literature is that the prospect of 
emigration raises the expected return to emigration, inducing a supply response. Ex post 
some of the high-skilled do not emigrate and so it is an empirical question whether the 
additional skills generated outweighs the loss through emigration. In their pioneering papers 
Beine et al. (2001) and Beine at al. (2008) found that a doubling of the emigration rate 
induces an increase of 5 percent in the acquisition of tertiary education. As a result the 
majority of developing countries experience a net brain gain. The countries least likely to 
experience a net brain gain are those with high emigration rates and high initial levels of 
human capital. These include some of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Central America 
the Caribbean and especially small island states.  
These results cast important new light on the brain drain. Although they appear to be robust 
they are based on aggregate data for migrant stocks, so that the precise underlying channels 
are not identified. Is it really true that the prospect of emigration stimulates education even 
for those who don’t emigrate ex post? Surveys of emigrant intentions support this view: far 
more people express some intention to emigrate than actually do emigrate (Van Dalen et al, 
2005; Gibson and McKenzie, 2012). A recent wave of research has investigated the 
underlying mechanisms at a more micro level. Examining survey data for the Cape Verde 
islands, Batista et al. (2012) find that the attainment of intermediate secondary schooling is 
strongly positively related to the individual’s probability of future emigration. In a study of 
Fiji Chand and Clemens (2008) find that exogenous regime change increased the incentives 
for Indians to emigrate and led to a surge in tertiary enrolment. These and other studies are 
for countries for which the aggregate data suggests that the brain drain outweighs the brain 
gain, and it would be interesting to know if similar results apply to countries with more 
modest high-skill emigration rates.  
A large proportion of high educated migrants received part of their education in the host 
country. Migration for education, particularly higher education, is increasingly important. 
Given that foreign students are a major source of income for universities in developed 
countries, it is surprising that student migration has only recently gained the attention of 
academic economists. One implication is that the source country educational response will 
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be focused on the higher school and lower university qualifications that provide access to 
more advanced study. Another is that the incidence of emigration is likely related to student 
achievement at home; if students are counted as migrants this would reinforce positive 
selection. Whether, in the long run, this adds significantly to the brain drain depends on 
whether they return to the home country. Estimates of return rates vary widely but they 
appear to be lower the higher the qualification and especially so for qualifications in 
subjects like science, engineering and medicine.  
Return migration is an obvious source of brain gain, whether skills were acquired at home or 
abroad. The evidence suggests that between 20 and 50 percent of immigrants return within 
five years (OECD, 2008) and that return (and sometimes circular) migration has been on the 
increase. One important implication is that gross flows will be a misleading guide to the 
current scale of the brain drain if a large proportion of the skilled return. The focus of earlier 
research was on whether return migrants were positively or negatively selected as in 
accordance with the predictions of the Roy model (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996). The typical 
finding was that returnees were negatively selected from the original emigrants (though not 
necessarily from the source population). More recently the focus has been on modelling 
return migration in a lifecycle context together with saving and human capital accumulation 
(Dustmann 1997; Mayr and Peri, 2009; Dustmann et al., 2011). Even if returnees are 
negatively selected from among migrants they may have gained skills that they would not 
otherwise have acquired. The literature on the wage and productivity gains of return 
migrants gives conflicting results. Perhaps this is not surprising given the differences in 
policy and in incentives produced by different combinations of origin and destination 
countries.  
Research on the brain drain has seen a remarkable renaissance. This is a clear case where a 
latent interest in the topic has been unleashed by new and better data. This has involved 
assembling data specifically for the purpose rather than simply staying within the confines 
of existing surveys collected for other purposes, as with much of the microeconometric 
literature. It has also stimulated some rethinking of the theoretical framework that 
dominated the earlier literature. We may be relieved that the negative effects on 
developing countries are less severe than was once thought, and perhaps for this reason 
less attention has been paid to policy implications. But the light of the evident demand for 
student migration it would be worth revising or replacing old policy ideas, such as the 
Bhagwati tax.   
The effects of diaspora 
What are the economic effects of an emigrant diaspora? Estimates of the worldwide gains 
from completely eliminating barriers to migration range from around one half to one and a 
half times global GDP (Clemens, 2011, p. 86). Such estimates are based on (increasingly 
sophisticated) general equilibrium models, in which migration equalises wages around the 
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world. One implication is massive and implausible emigration rates: upwards of half the 
population of non-OECD countries would need to emigrate. But much more modest 
increases would generate global gains that exceed those of eliminating all remaining trade 
barriers. It is important also to recognise that most of the gains accrue to the migrants 
themselves, and especially those moving from the poorest to the richest countries. A series 
of studies have sought to estimate migrant gains at the margin, allowing also for the non- 
random selection of emigrants. According to one study, potential emigrants from the 
Philippines to the United States could increase their income by a factor of 3.5, those from 
Haiti by 7.8 and those from Nigeria by 8.4 (Clemens et al., 2008).   
Even though these gains are likely to outweigh source country losses there is, nevertheless, 
an ongoing concern for the effects on those left behind (for a useful survey, see Lodigiani, 
2009). An obvious parallel with the destination country literature would be to look at the 
effects on wages, but surprisingly few papers have done this. One study applying the Borjas 
(2003) methodology to Mexico finds that the effect of emigration in the 1990s alone was to 
raise the relative wage of high school graduates by 4 percent and the wage of those with 
college education by 3 percent (Mishra, 2007, p. 193). Another parallel is the possible fiscal 
cost. Some of the older studies focused particularly on the cost to source country taxpayers 
of educating those that subsequently emigrated (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974). But there 
are surprisingly few estimates, even of the direct fiscal costs. One estimate for Indians who 
migrated to the US between 1994 and 2006 puts the current net fiscal loss at around 1 
percent of GDP (Desai et al., 2009).  
Among the potentially positive effects, one of the most enduring themes is the flow of 
remittances. Recent efforts to collect more comprehensive data indicate that remittances 
are even more important than previously thought. Remittance flows grew by a factor of five 
in real terms over the last two decades. In recent years the scale of North-South remittances 
has been equivalent to about half of foreign direct investment and double the amount of 
official development aid. For more than 20 countries with large emigrant diasporas the 
remittances amount to more than ten percent of GDP (Yang, 2011, p. 134). The literature on 
the macroeconomic impacts has followed the analysis of other inward capital flows, with a 
focus on country-level panel data. Clearly remittance flows can work through a variety of 
channels, including negative Dutch-disease effects or positive Keynesian effects, but much 
of the focus has been on domestic investment.  The results have been mixed, and rather 
disappointing, perhaps reflecting differences in the underlying motives for remitting and the 
cross-country heterogeneity in the effects (Docqier and Rapoport, 2006; Barajas et al. 2009). 
From the 1990s research turned to investigating the impact of the receipt of remittances at 
the household level--something that reflects the growing availability of source country 
micro-data. A key issue is the degree to which flows of remittances avert or relieve poverty 
among the households receiving them. Evidently remittances make a substantial difference 
in Latin America and in some African countries. To take one example Acosta et al. (2006, 
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p.79) found that the poverty headcount (at under $2 per day) is reduced by 2.1 percentage 
points in Mexico and 5.1 percentage points in El Salvador. But it is important to be clear 
about whether the counterfactual is no emigration or just no remittances. In the absence of 
the ability to remit, some emigrants would not go if it meant leaving the rest of the family in 
poverty. Although emigrants increase their incomes, in general they only remit a small 
fraction of those gains. As a result the remaining household may not be better off than it 
would be without a member having emigrated; this is the case for Mexico but not for El 
Salvador.  Nevertheless, the household’s income might be less volatile, as Stark (1990) 
suggested and as some empirical studies have found.  
A further issue is whether remittances can be seen as in some sense promoting 
development. Much of the focus in recent work has been on whether remittances are 
invested in land, businesses, implements or other durables or if it is simply consumed. 
Mostly, it seems to have been used for consumption, but such estimates are vulnerable to 
endogeneity bias. Yang (2008) used the 1998 exchange rate shock to examine the effects of 
the increase in the real value of remittances to the Philippines. Most of the gain was used 
for investment although this partly reflects the temporary nature of the shock. Other 
studies have focused on the effects of remittances on the education and health of those left 
behind, particularly children (e.g. Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Acosta et al., 2006). As 
elsewhere the results have been mixed, and it is not always clear whether they are simply 
the effect of an increase in income or whether there is something special about income 
from remittances.  
At a more macro level, a number of studies have examined the relationships between the 
size and location of emigrant diasporas and flows of trade and investment from the 
destination country to the origin. These have been explored for different sets of source and 
destination countries using gravity-style models, with the idea that expatriate communities 
either have preferences for home country goods or can reduce the costs of trade with the 
home country. The elasticities of imports or exports with respect to the migrant stock range 
from close to zero to 0.5 and these vary  by country characteristics, classes of goods and 
types of migrant (Lodigiani, 2009, p. 30). Investment flows from rich host to poor(er) origin 
countries are also positively correlated with the size of the diaspora and especially with the 
share of high-skilled. As yet, it is difficult to assess the importance of diaspora effects on 
trade and investment overall, both because of the wide range of estimates and because of 
the lack of welfare analysis. Nevertheless such studies do point to the globalising role of 
diasporas through developing business networks and facilitating technology transfer.  
An intriguing recent development is the study of the effects of diasporas on political and 
institutional structures in the home country. One might think that, by exercising the 
possibility of exit rather than voice, emigration of those with more human capital would 
lead to slower institutional improvement in source countries. But some studies have shown 
the opposite. Li and McHale (2009) find that a skilled diaspora is associated with weaker 
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economic institutions but stronger political institutions in the home country.  Although the 
mechanisms remain obscure, much of this probably occurs through return migration. In a 
fascinating study Spilimbergo (2009) shows that the more emigrants that acquire foreign 
university education in a democratic country the more democratic the source country 
becomes. But there may also be a downside; diasporas may support terrorism, criminal 
networks or trafficking in drugs or people. Those formed by refugees and dissidents may 
fund or foment civil wars in the home countries, either directly or through influencing host 
country governments (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). Such issues have yet to be fully 
explored and absorbed into migration economics.   
It is difficult to do justice to the diverse literature on the effects of diasporas on the origin 
country. As elsewhere data constraints are a limiting factor that is slowly being eased and 
the theory is gradually being refined. Progress has also been fostered by linking with the 
issues and methodology of development economics as well as by encroaching upon the 
agendas of other social sciences. Here, as elsewhere, the imperialism of economic methods 
into other social sciences accounts for at least part of its continued vitality. But as with other 
imperialisms insufficient account is often taken of the local culture.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion it is worth re-emphasising some of the key trends in research on international 
migration. These include the shift from a research agenda that was focused mainly on the 
effects of immigration to US and later to Europe, to one that is more global and diverse. 
While the topics and techniques were originally transposed from the US to other countries 
where immigration became a burning issue, research in and on those countries 
subsequently gained a momentum of its own. In the newer topics outlined above, 
European-based research is now at the forefront. At the same time there is a growing 
interest in countries outside the OECD, which is already beginning to spawn a new diaspora 
of ideas. This includes a shift in focus towards South-South migration. Coupled with this is a 
distinct trend towards the diffusion of research at the micro level, which has fed on the 
availability of an increasingly rich and ever widening range of datasets. And as with other 
areas of economics, there is a focus on tighter links between theory and empirics. This is 
reflected in an increasing focus on endogeneity issues, which in turn has given rise in very 
recent years to the search for natural experiments and to experimental research designs.  
So where should it go from here? In a provocative paper Clemens (2011, p. 99) suggests that 
issues like remittances and the brain drain are “a research agenda whose time has gone”. 
His point is not that interest in these topics is flagging but that the effects they study are not 
economically important. The same could perhaps be said of the literatures on the 
assimilation and labour market impacts of immigration. Instead, he argues that the focus 
should be on the key elements that would help to produce better estimates of the global 
gains to free(er) international migration.  At one level I have some sympathy with this view. 
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For example, the literature on assimilation often assumes a rather pessimistic hue because 
it compares immigrants with similar workers at the destination and it potentially diverts 
attention away from the enormous gains realised by immigrants moving from poor to rich 
countries. Similarly, the literature on the diverse impacts of migration, both for destination 
and for source countries, tends to focus on the consequences for the stayers and not on the 
movers.   
Clemens suggests that this is the result of a focus on welfare at the national level rather 
than at the international level. While there is some truth in this, there are also good reasons 
for it (and not just modern-day academic mercantilism as he implies). The global gains from 
migration are indisputably large and better measurement is unlikely to overturn that 
finding. But how can they be realised? Like it or not, the fact is that immigration policy is 
under the control of nation states and there are compelling reasons why this is unlikely to 
change (Hatton, 2007). As we have seen, in the rich countries where the easing of 
immigration policies would create the greatest gains, liberalisation is constrained by 
negative public attitudes. My reading of the literature over a quarter of a century is that the 
results have largely discredited people’s worst fears about the threats from immigration. 
Thus immigrants do assimilate (even if slowly), the wage impacts are modest (even if 
underestimated), the fiscal impacts are not as dire as often supposed, and we have less 
need to feel guilty about the brain drain. Yet despite all the effort, academic researchers 
have failed to get this message across to society at large. In my view the pressing need is to 
better understand the political economy of immigration policy and then to use this 
knowledge to design immigration policies that would better overcome the popular 
resistance to freer migration.  
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